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Abstract 
It is well documented that young children greatly overestimate their performance on tests 
of retrospective memory (RM) but the present investigation was the first to examine their 
prediction accuracy for prospective memory (PM). Three studies were conducted, each 
testing a different group of 5-year-olds. In Study 1 (n=46), participants were asked to 
predict their success in a simple event-based PM task (remembering to convey a message 
to a toy mole if they encountered a particular picture during a picture-naming activity). 
Before naming the pictures the children listened to either a reminder story or a neutral 
story. Results showed that children were highly accurate in their PM predictions (78% 
accuracy) and that the reminder story appeared to benefit PM only in children who 
predicted they would remember the PM response. In Study 2 (n=80), children showed 
high PM prediction accuracy (69%) regardless of whether the cue was specific or general, 
and despite typical over-optimism regarding their performance on a 10-item RM task 
using item-by-item prediction. Study 3 (n=35) showed that children were prone to over-
estimate RM even when asked about their ability to recall a single item, the mole’s 
unusual name. In light of these findings we consider possible reasons for children’s 
impressive PM prediction accuracy, including the potential involvement of future 
thinking in performance predictions and PM.    
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Metamemory prediction accuracy for simple prospective and retrospective memory 
tasks in 5-year-old children 
The concept of metamemory was introduced to the literature by Flavell (1971), 
who argued that memory development during childhood is attributable largely to the 
development of knowledge about how memory works and the strategic application of 
such knowledge during memory tasks (declarative and procedural metamemory, 
respectively). Declarative metamemory reflects the understanding of person, task, and 
strategy variables affecting memory (reviews by Cavanaugh & Perlmutter, 1982; Weed, 
Ryan, & Day, 1990). In relation to memory for past information or retrospective memory 
(RM), one might know, for example, that remembering a long list of words is more 
difficult than remembering a short list of words (task variable), that adults typically 
outperform children on such tasks (person variable), or that rehearsing to-be-remembered 
items is better than simply looking at them (strategy variable). Procedural metamemory, 
on the other hand, reflects the ability to apply this declarative knowledge in the service of 
memory, as well as to monitor, regulate, and predict one’s memory performance (Flavell, 
Miller, & Miller, 2002; Schneider & Lockl, 2008). For example, a child might expect to 
recall names of children from her current class but to forget the names of children from 
her kindergarten class attended few years ago.  
A large body of research on metamemory development suggests that young 
children (aged 4-6 years) have fairly limited understanding of person, task and strategy 
variables affecting RM (Bjorklund, Dukes, & Brown, 2009; O’Sullivan, 1996; 
O’Sullivan, Howe, & Marche, 1996; Schneider & Pressley; 1997; Wellman, 1977). It has 
also been shown that the most striking developments in declarative metamemory take 
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place between the ages of 4- and 8 years; by the time they reach third grade, most 
children have a reasonable grasp of factors influencing remembering (e.g., O’Sullivan et 
al., 1996). In addition, children with superior declarative metamemory perform better on 
RM tasks than children with inferior declarative metamemory (Flavell, 1971; Henry & 
Norman, 1996; Koriat, Goldsmith & Pansky, 2000; O’Sullivan, 1996; Schneider & 
Sodian, 1988; Short, Schatschneider, & Friebert, 1993; Schneider, 1998).  
Limited knowledge about memory-related variables in younger children might 
explain their highly inflated view of their RM memory capacity. Typically, this is 
assessed by the study-predict-recall paradigm in which children are exposed to the to-be-
recalled material (e.g., words, pictures, toys) and asked to predict how many they will be 
able to recall from memory, before actually recalling them. Although different amounts 
of study materials have been used (10, 15 or even 30 items), results invariably show that 
4- to 6-year old children grossly overestimate the number of recalled items (Dunlosky & 
Metcalfe, 2009; Lipko, Dunlosky, Lipowski, & Merriman, 2012; Shin, Bjorklund, & 
Beck, 2007; Yussen & Levy, 1975). For example, in a study by Lipko, Dunlosky, and 
Merriman (2009), 4- and 5-year olds studied 10 pictures for 10 seconds, predicted how 
many they would recall, and then attempted to recall them. In total, there were five 
consecutive trials with different sets of pictures. Results showed that children repeatedly 
overestimated their performance across all five trials, even when they accurately assessed 
the small number of actually recalled items on a previous trial. These findings have been 
replicated recently by Lipowski, Merriman and Dunlosky (2013) who assessed children’s 
predictions in a cued recall task on item-by-item bases, rather than asking them to make 
global predictions. Thus, 4- and 5-year old children were shown 12 animal toys one by 
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one, and heard what their names were. Children had to recall the name of the toy and then 
were asked whether they thought they would be able to remember the name if they were 
questioned about it later. Predictions or judgements of learning (yes/no) were solicited 
either immediately or after a 2-minute delay. Results showed that children significantly 
overestimated their recall in both the immediate and delayed judgement of learning tasks 
(Experiment 1; no practice condition in Experiment 3), with particularly strong optimism 
in the immediate condition where 24 out of 29 children predicted that they would recall 
all 12 names.   
Metamemory Regarding Prospective Memory 
 In contrast to RM, the topic of metamemory has hardly been studied in relation to 
prospective memory (PM), which involves remembering to carry out intended actions in 
future (e.g., keeping an appointment, posting a letter or taking a medication). Like adults, 
children have to carry out PM tasks on daily basis and frequent forgetting can be 
similarly disruptive for their everyday functioning (e.g., forgetting to take homework to 
school or passing on a message). Two early studies examined children’s declarative 
metamemory for PM by questioning them about their understanding of reminders for PM 
tasks. First, Kreutzer, Leonard, and Flavell (1975) asked three age groups (4- to 5-year-
olds, 6- to 7-year-olds, and 10- to 11-year-olds) to list every possible strategy they could 
think of to remember to take their skates to school the next morning, with answers being 
scored for references to internal strategies (e.g., mentally repeating the intention) versus 
various external strategies (e.g., placing the skates near the front door, writing a note). 
The results showed little in the way of developmental improvement, with children of all 
ages tending to focus on external strategies – despite the fact that the older children 
CHILDREN’S METAMEMORY PREDICTIONS     6 
 
greatly surpassed the younger children in the number and sophistication of strategies they 
were able to suggest in response to questions about RM (e.g., how to remember an event 
from last Christmas). Second, Beal (1985) compared the ability of children (aged 5-, 6-, 
and 8 years) and young adults to choose between two potential reminder cues to assist 
performance on each of six different PM tasks. Similar to Kreutzer et al. (1975), there 
were no significant age differences in accuracy between the three groups of children. In 
addition, although 5- and 6-year-olds were reliably less accurate than the adults, the 
performance of the 8-year-olds matched the adults and was at ceiling level. 
 To date, there has been no research examining children’s predictions regarding 
their PM accuracy. Moreover, the pattern emerging from the few available studies on 
adults is one of under-estimation of PM ability (Knight, Harnett, & Titov, 2005; Meeks, 
Hicks, & Marsh, 2007; Schnitzspahn, Zeintl, Jäger, & Kliegel, 2011; but see Devolder, 
Brigham, & Pressley, 1990). For example, in the Meeks et al. (2007) study, participants 
had to remember to press a key when seeing a particular target word during an ongoing 
lexical decision task. For half the participants the PM target word was a word depicting 
an animal, and for the remaining participants it was a syllable ‘tor’ in a word. After 
receiving PM instructions, participants had to predict what percentage of target words (0 
to 100) they would be able to act upon in the lexical decision task. Following a 4-minute 
distracter task, all participants completed the lexical decision task and encountered eight 
PM targets. Results showed that participants in both conditions predicted to respond to 
about 50% of cues but their performance was significantly higher than 50%. In addition, 
while there was a small but significant correlation between PM predictions and actual 
performance in the animal target condition (r=.29, p<.05) the correlation in the syllable 
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condition was not significant (r=.15, p>.05). These findings suggest that adults lack 
confidence in their PM. As speculated by Meeks et al. (2007), people might form an 
unfavourable opinion of their own PM capabilities due to frequent experience of PM 
lapses in everyday life.  
The Present Investigation 
Despite a long tradition of research into the development of metamemory skills 
surrounding retrospective remembering, we know little about children’s metamemory 
regarding PM and nothing at all about their ability to predict their PM performance. The 
lack of information on the latter point is notable given that children’s judgements about 
the reliability of their PM are likely to influence the extent to which they use external 
reminders and engage in elaborative planning of intended actions (as argued by Kliegel, 
Mackinlay, & Jäger, 2008). Given this gap in the literature, the present research sought to 
garner preliminary evidence on young children’s predictions about their PM success. We 
conducted three studies, each testing a different group of 5-year-olds; Study 1 focused on 
PM prediction accuracy for a single PM task performed after a delay during a simple 
picture naming task, Study 2 compared prediction accuracy for PM and RM tasks, and 
Study 3 evaluated RM prediction accuracy using a single RM item analogous to the 
earlier PM tests.  
We focused on 5-year-olds for two important reasons. First, the extensive 
evidence that children this age perform poorly on tests of RM prediction would suggest 
that children may similarly overestimate their PM performance. However, developmental 
research on PM has uncovered modest age-related variance in PM after the age of 5 
years, leading to the claim that PM and RM constitute largely distinct capabilities with 
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PM maturing faster than RM (Kvavilashvili, Messer, & Ebdon, 2001; Kvavilashvili, 
Kyle, & Messer, 2008; Maylor & Logie, 2010). On this basis, it might be expected that 
PM prediction accuracy will be superior to RM prediction accuracy in 5-year-old 
children. 
Second, evidence suggests that between 3- and 6 years of age children show 
striking improvements in their capacity for mental time travel, an ability that enables 
them to think about the future and consider hypothetical events (Suddendorf & Busby, 
2005). Mental time travel is argued to involve self-reflective consciousness (autonoetic 
consciousness; Tulving, 2002), a form of consciousness that is believed to play an 
important role in memory (Koriat, 2007). Recently, some authors have suggested that the 
growth of self-reflective consciousness during early childhood might partly underpin the 
development of PM by enabling children to encode their PM intentions more efficiently 
(Atance & Jackson, 2009; Ford, Driscoll, Shum, & Macaulay, 2012). Specifically, the 
idea is that children will find it easier to form PM intentions if they mentally project 
themselves into the future and imagine themselves carrying out the intended response at 
the appropriate time (see Brewer & Marsh, 2010, for a similar proposal regarding adults’ 
PM). This line of reasoning raises the possibility of substantial overlap between the 
cognitive processes involved in PM itself and the cognitive processes involved in PM 
performance predictions (which naturally pertain to the future), meaning that many 5-
year-olds could show relatively good prediction accuracy for PM tasks. Moreover, 
prediction accuracy should be related to PM performance, such that children with 
superior PM are more likely to predict correctly than children with inferior PM. 
Accordingly, in Studies 1 and 2 we examined children’s PM predictions as a function of 
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PM performance (pass vs. fail). We expected that children who passed the PM test would 
generally predict that they would be successful (i.e., good insight into own PM) whereas 
children who failed the PM test would not generally predict that they would be 
unsuccessful (i.e., poor insight into own PM). 
An additional aim of Study 1 was to examine the effects of subtle reminders on 
PM performance. To this end, the delay interval between soliciting PM predictions and 
the onset of the PM task was filled by reading children either a neutral story (‘Clumsy 
Alligator’) or a reminder story (‘Forgetful Spider’) – with the latter story describing a 
character who suffered numerous examples of retrospective and prospective memory 
failures. We reasoned that such examples could act as cues for reminding children of 
their PM task. Since research on adults has shown that subtle cues enhance PM 
performance (Taylor, Marsh, Hicks & Hancock, 2004), we expected that the reminder 
story would improve children’s PM accuracy in comparison to the neutral story. 
Moreover, if successful PM involves self-reflective consciousness, then children who 
predict remembering the PM task should benefit from the reminder story more than 
children who predict forgetting given their greater tendency for future thinking when 
making a prediction and, hence, their heightened sensitivity to performance-related cues.   
Study 1 
Method 
Participants 
A total of 51 children (25 boys, 26 girls) were recruited from three primary 
schools. All children were aged between 5 years 2 months and 5 years 8 months (M = 5 
years 5 months), and spoke English as their primary language. Although the consent (in 
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loco parentis) was granted by school headteachers, children’s consent was also obtained. 
Children were randomly assigned to two conditions that varied in terms of which story 
was read to them prior to the PM task (reminder story vs. neutral story).  
Materials 
Fourteen line drawings of concrete nouns were taken from the Snodgrass and 
Vanderwart (1980) pool of line drawings. To ensure that 5-year old children had no 
problems naming them, each of the nouns chosen was within the early age-of-acquisition 
range (1.5 to 2.5 years), had almost 100% name agreement and high familiarity ratings in 
5- to 6-year olds, using norms from Cycowiz, Friedman, Rothstein and Snodgrass (1997) 
and Morrison, Chappell, and Ellis (1997). The drawings were affixed to green square-
shaped cardboard cards (12.5cm x 12.5cm). Four cards were used for a practice trial 
(flower, ladder, carrot, table) and the remaining 10 cards were used for the main picture-
naming task (balloon, moon, key, brush, fork, tractor, umbrella, clock, cake, glasses). A 
PM target card depicted a picture of a tractor. Two stories - ‘The Forgetful Spider’ and 
‘The Clumsy Alligator’ - were taken from the illustrated children’s story book by June 
Woodman (1994). In the former, the spider not only forgets what he did a day before but 
forgets to pass on a message on four consecutive occasions. In the latter, the alligator 
repeatedly trips over or stamps on his friends and annoys everyone. 
Procedure 
Children were tested individually in a quiet room at their school. After initial 
greetings the researcher showed the child a toy mole, introduced as her friend ‘Morris’, 
which she positioned in the centre of the table. The child was told that the story book and 
picture cards on the table belonged to Morris, who allegedly could not see very well and 
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needed the child’s help. All children expressed willingness to help the mole. They were 
then informed that Morris wanted the researcher to read a story from the book and the 
child to name the pictures on the cards. The researcher demonstrated how to name the 
cards from the practice stack. This was done by holding up one card from the pile, 
naming it, and placing it down on the table. Each child was given a chance to name all 
four cards to ensure that they knew what they had to do and were praised once they 
finished the practice trial. 
At this point the instructions for the PM task were introduced. Specifically, the 
researcher said: “Before naming the cards, I am going to read you and Morris a short 
story from this story book, would you like to hear the story?” After the child agreed, she 
continued: “Oh, I almost forgot to tell you that the mole is afraid of tractors.  So, if you 
happen to see a picture of a tractor on any of these cards (pointing to the stack of cards to 
be named later on), could you please tell Morris not to be afraid of it as it is only a 
picture?” After the child answered affirmatively, the researcher asked: “Now, do you 
think you will remember to tell him this if you see a picture of a tractor or do you think 
you may forget?” The child was allowed to have a little time to consider this before the 
researcher recorded their prediction (will remember or forget). The researcher then 
presented the child with a confidence rating scale consisting of a horizontal line with 
three boxes underneath depicting the printed words ‘very sure’, ‘sure’ and ‘not sure’, and 
said: “Now, I want you to tell me how sure you are that you will remember (or forget, if 
the child predicted forgetting) to tell the mole not to be afraid. Look at this picture, this 
box means that you are very sure, this box means that you are just sure, and this box 
means that you are not sure at all. Now, how sure do you think you are?” Children had to 
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point to the box and say their choice out loud, and the researcher recorded their response 
(3=very sure, 2=sure, and 1=not sure).  
After obtaining the confidence rating, the researcher read a story. Half the 
children heard ‘The Forgetful Spider’ story, which could potentially remind them of their 
PM task, and the other half heard ‘The Clumsy Alligator’ story that did not contain any 
references to forgetting. While reading the story, the researcher showed the child relevant 
illustrations from the book ensuring that they were fully engaged in the story. On 
finishing the story, which took around 5-7 minutes to narrate, the child was told that they 
now had to name the cards for Morris. No mention of the PM task was made at this stage. 
The order of card presentation was the same for each child and the target card with a 
picture of a tractor was always in the 6th position in the stack. If the child took longer than 
five seconds to name a picture, the researcher named it herself and asked the child to 
continue. The researcher recorded whether the child remembered to re-assure the mole 
(i.e., telling him not to be afraid) when naming the target card with the tractor. 
All children were praised when they finished naming the cards regardless of 
whether they remembered the PM task. However, those who forgot to carry out the PM 
task were given the following probe questions to determine whether their failure reflected 
a genuine PM lapse or, alternatively, inability to recall the PM instructions: (1) “Was 
there anything else you had to do when naming the pictures?”; (2) “Was there anything 
else you had to do when you saw a particular picture?”; (3) “Was there anything you had 
to do when you saw a picture of a tractor?” and (4) “Didn’t you have to tell Morris not to 
be frightened when you saw a picture of a tractor?” If the child could not recall or 
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recognize the PM task after this final probe, it was assumed that his/her failure was due to 
retrospective forgetting of instructions and his/her data were excluded from the analyses.  
Results 
Of 51 children, 27 (53%) did not remember the PM task (i.e., they forgot to tell 
Morris not to be afraid of the tractor). Post-experimental probing found that five children 
failed to recall the PM instructions even following the final and most specific prompt, 
indicating that they had no RM for the PM instructions. Therefore, the data of these five 
children were excluded and all the analyses reported below are based on 46 children. All 
parametric tests were conducted using a 2-tailed level of significance of p<.05 (marginal 
p<.10). 
PM predictions and performance 
 The top panel of Table 1 (panel a) shows the number of children who remembered 
or forgot the PM response as a function of initial PM prediction (i.e., ‘will remember’ vs. 
‘will forget’). Of 28 children who predicted remembering, 21 (75%) did remember the 
PM task, but of 18 children who predicted forgetting only 3 (17%) remembered the task. 
The relation between children’s predictions and their actual performance was reliable, 
χ2(1, N=46)=14.94, p<.001 (Phi Coefficient = .57). In other words, there were 36 
children (78%) who made a correct prediction (either predicted remember and 
remembered or predicted forget and forgot), seven children (15%) who over-estimated 
their performance (by predicting remembering but forgetting the task), and only three 
children (7%) who under-estimated their performance (by predicting forgetting but 
actually remembering the PM task). A goodness-of-fit test showed that these percentages 
were significantly different from the expected percentages (50%, 25%, and 25%, 
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respectively), had the children been making predictions at chance level χ2(2, 
N=46)=15.39, p<.001.   
The middle and lower sections of Table 1 present the results separately for 
children who heard the neutral story (panel b) versus the reminder story (panel c). When 
considered individually, the relation between PM prediction and PM performance was 
reliable for both the neutral story condition, χ2(1, N=23)=3.88, p=.049 (Phi Coefficient = 
.41) and the reminder story condition, χ2(1, N=23)=11.51, p=.001 (Phi Coefficient = .71). 
Further analyses examined whether PM prediction accuracy differed between 
children who remembered the PM task and those who forgot. Among the 24 children who 
enacted the PM response, 21 had predicted that they would succeed on the task (88%) 
and 3 had predicted that they would fail (12%). These percentages were significantly 
different from the expected percentages had the children been making predictions at 
random, χ2(1, N=24)=13.50, p<.001. In contrast, among those 22 children who forgot to 
enact the PM response, the percentages of children who predicted they would either fail 
(68%, n=15) or remember the PM task (32%, n=7) were only marginally different to 
chance, χ2(1, N=22)=2.91, p=.088. In addition, there was a trend in the predicted 
direction showing that the proportion of children who correctly forecast PM success was 
higher than the proportion of children who correctly forecast PM failure (.88 vs. .68), 
z=1.65, p=.098, 2-tailed. 
Effects of story condition 
To examine the effects of the stories on children’s PM performance, we compared 
the proportion of children who remembered the task in the neutral story (.39) and 
reminder story (.65) conditions (see Table 1, panels b and c). Although the difference 
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between these proportions was in the predicted direction (.65 vs. .39), z=1.77, p=.076, 2-
tailed, the reminder story appeared to benefit only the children who expected to 
remember the PM task. Among the children who predicted remembering, the proportion 
that really did enact the PM response was marginally greater in the reminder story 
condition than in the neutral story condition (.88 vs. .58), z=1.76, p=.078, 2-tailed. 
Among the children who forecast they would fail, the success rate was equivalent for the 
reminder- versus neutral story conditions (.14 vs. .18), z=0.22, p=.826, 2-tailed. 
PM confidence ratings 
Table 2 shows the equivalent breakdown of children’s ratings of confidence in 
their PM predictions. Confidence was high (maximum possible score=3) regardless of 
whether children predicted remembering or forgetting. A 2 (PM prediction: will 
remember vs. will forget) x 2 (PM performance: remembered vs. forgot) ANOVA 
showed no significant main effects and no interaction, p values>.10. Results for the 
individual story conditions are not presented given small sample sizes in some cells. 
Nevertheless, comparison of the two conditions showed that overall confidence did not 
differ reliably between them (neutral story M=2.70 SD=.64, reminder story M=2.43 
SD=.84), t(44)=1.19, p=.24.  
Discussion 
Results of Study 1 showed that children were exceedingly accurate in their PM 
predictions, with 36 of 46 participants (78%) responding correctly. This was despite the 
fact that actual PM performance was nowhere near ceiling level (52%) leaving plenty of 
scope for overestimation. Only 15% of the sample were overly sure of their PM response 
(i.e., forgetting the task when expecting to remember) with a further 7% being modest 
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about their PM abilities (i.e., remembering the response when expecting to fail). Children 
were also highly confident in their PM predictions and confidence ratings did not differ 
significantly as a function of either prediction (‘will remember vs. ‘will forget’) or 
accuracy (remembered vs. forgot). 
Furthermore, there was a trend in predicted direction showing that hearing a 
reminder story, emphasizing memory issues and the adverse consequences of forgetting, 
increased PM performance but only in children who predicted that they would remember 
to enact the target response. This finding suggests that the cognitive processes underlying 
PM performance predictions may have differed between children who predicted success 
(and were not guessing) and children who predicted failure (and were not guessing). 
Based on the idea that PM involves future thinking, we speculate that children who 
predicted success were more likely to think about themselves carrying out the task; that 
is, imagining the moment of finding the target picture and warning the toy mole not to be 
afraid – an activity that could have strengthened their intention and increased their 
sensitivity to incidental reminders in the environment. In contrast, we think it unlikely 
that children who predicted failure imagined themselves finding the target picture and 
then forgetting to warn the toy mole – if their pessimistic prediction had involved future 
thinking then it follows that the reminder story should have jogged their PM just as 
effectively as it did for children who predicted success. Possibly, children who predicted 
failing the task instead based their judgment on declarative knowledge regarding PM; that 
is, they might have remembered their parents or teachers complaining about their own or 
other people’s PM lapses.  
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The close relation between PM metamemory and PM itself was further 
highlighted in Study 1 by the observation that prediction accuracy was superior to chance 
only for children who passed the PM task. Among children who ultimately remembered 
to enact the PM response, the number who predicted they would remember to do so was 
much greater than the number who predicted they would forget (ratio 7:1). Among 
children who ultimately forgot to enact the PM response, the number who predicted 
failure was similar to the number who predicted success (ratio 2:1). These results suggest 
that children with superior PM had greater insight into their own PM, as expected if the 
same cognitive processes (such as future thinking) underlie both optimistic PM 
performance predictions and actual PM. 
Our demonstration of such accurate PM predictions by 5-year-olds might be 
considered surprising given the extensive literature documenting grossly inflated 
predictions of RM accuracy in this age group. Accordingly, the primary aim of Study 2 
was to replicate and extend the findings of Study 1 by asking a new sample of children to 
estimate their performance accuracy for both PM and RM. The PM task was modelled on 
that used in Study 1, but this time we presented just the neutral story and manipulated the 
nature of the PM instructions (specific versus general). Research with adult participants 
has shown that general instructions elicit lower PM accuracy than specific instructions 
(e.g., Ellis & Milne, 1996). We therefore wanted to see whether children’s accurate PM 
predictions would extend to a more difficult task for which the target picture was not 
precisely identified. In addition, the manipulation of instruction specificity enabled us to 
gauge the depth of insight that 5-year olds have into their PM. If they have well 
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developed declarative metamemory for PM tasks then more children should predict 
remembering the PM task in the specific- than general instruction condition.   
To compare PM and RM prediction accuracy, after completing the PM task, all 
children were asked to name the pictures again and to predict which pictures they would 
be able to recall later on. Given that there were 10 pictures in the set, we ensured 
comparability with the earlier PM prediction task by eliciting judgements on an item-by-
item basis; in other words, as each picture was presented, children were asked whether 
they thought they would later remember or forget it (cf. Lipowski et al., 2013). We 
wanted to compare overall levels of prediction accuracy for PM versus RM across the 
sample and, moreover, to examine inter-individual differences in memory and memory 
predictions across the two tasks. 
Study 2 
Method 
Participants 
A total of 80 children (40 boys, 40 girls) from three different primary schools 
took part. All the children were aged between 5 years 2 months and 5 years 6 months (M 
= 5 years 4 months), and spoke English as their primary language. In two schools, the 
consent (in loco parentis) was granted by headteachers, and in one school by parents. All 
children also consented themselves on the day of testing. They were randomly assigned 
to two conditions that varied in terms of the nature of the PM instructions (specific 
instructions vs. general instructions).  
Materials 
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Materials were the same as for Study 1 except that one of the pictures (a picture of 
a key) was replaced with a picture of a horse, which was the target picture for the PM 
task in both conditions, and it was presented in the 7th rather than 6th position in the stack. 
None of the remaining pictures were of animals. The confidence scale used was also 
identical to the one in Study 1, but the options were presented in the reverse order, i.e., 
‘not sure’, ‘sure’ and ‘very sure’. The story presented following the PM instructions and 
prior to the PM task was the neutral story, ‘The Clumsy Alligator’. 
Procedure 
The procedure was modelled on that used in Study 1, only varying the nature of 
the PM task instructions. In the case of specific instructions, children were told that 
Morris was frightened of horses and if they came across a picture of a horse in the stack 
they had to tell Morris not to be frightened as it was only a picture and not a real horse. In 
the case of general instructions, children were told that Morris was frightened of animals 
and if they came across a picture of an animal in the stack they had to tell Morris not to 
be frightened as it was only a picture and not a real animal. Within each instruction 
condition half the children were asked, “Do you think you will remember to tell Morris 
not to be frightened when you see a picture of a horse (animal) or do you think you may 
forget?” and the remainder were asked, “Do you think you may forget to tell Morris not 
to be frightened when you see a picture of a horse (animal) or do you think you will 
remember?” As in Study 1, children were requested to rate their confidence in their PM 
prediction on a 3-point scale (1=not sure, 2=sure, 3=very sure). 
After finishing the picture naming task and follow-up probing of those children 
who forgot to carry out the PM task, the researcher introduced the RM task. Specifically, 
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she told the child that they were going to play a simple memory game in which they 
would be shown each picture from the pile again, one by one, and would have to state 
whether they thought they would remember it later when asked to recall the pile of cards 
from their memory. To make it clear that the test would involve recall rather than 
recognition-memory, children were informed that once all the cards were viewed they 
would have to “tell” Morris which pictures they had seen. Once the child agreed to do 
this, the researcher showed them the first picture and asked what it was. After the child 
named the picture the researcher asked, “Do you think you will remember this picture or 
do you think you may forget?” After the child made a prediction, the researcher asked the 
child: “Now, as before, how sure you are that you will remember this picture (or forget, if 
the child predicted forgetting)?” The child stated his/her confidence on the same 3-point 
scale (1=not sure, 2=sure, 3=very sure) that was used earlier for the PM task. This 
procedure was repeated for the remaining nine pictures. After predictions and ratings 
were made for all 10 pictures, the researcher asked the child to tell Morris what pictures 
were on the cards. The child was permitted to recall the pictures in any order, with their 
responses being recorded by the researcher. Children were then praised for helping 
Morris in the activity and given a sticker to reward them for taking part.      
Results 
Out of 80 children, 27 (34%) forgot to enact the PM response when encountering 
the target in the picture naming task. Post-experimental probing showed that all children 
succeeded in recalling the PM instructions in response to the first three prompts or 
recognized the task at the 4th prompt and thus all data were retained for analysis. There 
was no evidence that children’s PM predictions varied as a function of order of 
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questioning (will you remember/forget vs. will you forget/remember), χ2(1, N=80)=0.75, 
p=.39, and so data were pooled across the two orders. 
Effects of PM instructions on PM performance and predictions 
Of the 40 children who heard specific instructions, 31 remembered the PM task 
and 9 forgot. Of the children who heard the general instructions, 22 remembered the PM 
task and 18 forgot. As predicted, the proportion of children who remembered was reliably 
higher in the specific- than general instruction condition (.78 vs. .55), z=2.18, p=.030, 2-
tailed. In contrast, the proportions of children who expected to remember the PM task in 
the specific versus general instruction conditions (.78 and .68 respectively) were not 
significantly different from each other, z=1.01, p=.312, 2-tailed.  
PM predictions and performance 
The upper section of Table 3 (panel a) shows the number of children who 
remembered or forgot the PM response as a function of initial PM prediction (i.e., ‘will 
remember’ vs. ‘will forget’). Of 58 children who predicted remembering, 43 (74%) did 
remember the PM task, but of 22 children who predicted forgetting only 10 (45%) 
remembered the task. The relation between performance predictions and actual 
performance was significant, χ2(1, N=80)=5.87, p=.015 (Phi Coefficient = .27). In line 
with Study 1, the percentages of children who correctly predicted their PM (69%), 
underestimated (12%) or overestimated it (19%) were significantly different from the 
expected percentages had predictions been made at random, χ2(1, N=80)=11.88, p=.003.   
The middle and lower sections of Table 3 present the results separately for 
children who heard specific instructions (panel b) and children who heard general 
instructions (panel c). When considered individually, the relation between PM prediction 
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and PM performance was reliable for general instructions, χ2(1, N=40)=4.57, p=.03 (Phi 
Coefficient = .34); moreover, the percentages of children who correctly predicted their 
PM performance (67.5%), and under- (10%) or overestimated it (22.5%) were 
significantly different from the percentages expected at chance level, χ2(2, N=40)=6.15, 
p=.046. Although the relation between PM prediction and PM performance was not 
significant in the specific condition, reflecting the higher levels of performance in that 
condition, χ2(1, N=40)=0.78, p=.38 (Phi Coefficient = .14), a goodness-of-fit test 
nevertheless yielded a significant outcome. Applied to the data from the specific 
condition, for which 28 children (70%) made a correct prediction, 6 children (15%) over-
estimated their performance, and 6 children (15%) under-estimated their performance, 
this test revealed that results were significantly different from the expected results had the 
children been guessing, χ2(2, N=40)=6.40, p=.04.  
 Of 53 children who remembered the PM task, there were 43 who predicted that 
they would be successful (81%) and 10 who wrongly predicted they would fail (19%). 
These percentages were significantly different from the expected percentages had the 
children been making predictions at random, χ2(1, N=53)=20.55, p<.0001. Of 27 children 
who forgot the PM task, there were 12 who predicted that they would fail (44%) and 15 
who wrongly expected to pass (56%). These percentages were not reliably different from 
predictions made at random, χ2(1, N=27)=0.33, p=.56. The proportion of children who 
correctly forecast PM success was reliably higher than the proportion of children who 
correctly forecast PM failure (.81 vs. .44), z=3.37, p<.001, 2-tailed. 
PM confidence ratings 
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Table 4 shows means (and standard deviations) of confidence ratings for the PM 
predictions. A 2 (PM prediction: will remember vs. will forget) x 2 (PM performance: 
remembered vs. forgot) ANOVA showed that children who predicted ‘will remember’ 
were more confident in their judgements than children who predicted ‘will forget’, 
F(1,76)=5.34, p=.02. However, there was no significant main effect of PM performance 
and no interaction, p values>.10. Comparison of the two PM instruction conditions 
showed that overall confidence did not differ reliably between them (specific instructions 
M=2.65 SD=.66, general instructions M=2.63 SD=.63), t(78)=0.17, p=.86. Similarly, 
confidence ratings were equivalent when considering only the children who predicted 
remembering (specific instructions M=2.77 SD=.50, general instructions M=2.70 
SD=.61), t(56)=0.49, p=.63, or only the children who predicted forgetting (specific 
instructions M=2.22 SD=.97, general instructions M=2.46 SD=.66), t(20)=-0.69, p=.50. 
RM predictions and performance 
Of 80 children, there were 61 (76%) who expected to remember all 10 pictures, 
11 (14%) who expected to remember 9 pictures, 5 (6%) who expected to remember 8 
pictures, and 3 (4%) who expected to remember 7 pictures. The mean number of pictures 
that children predicted they would recall in total (M=9.63 SD=.77) was significantly 
higher than the mean number of pictures that they actually recalled (M=4.64 SD=1.18), 
t(79)=4.99, p<.001, ηp²=.93.  
Examining the data on an item-by-item basis showed that in the case of the first 
picture to be presented, 79 of 80 children predicted that they would be able to recall it 
whereas only 29 went on to recall it. For the remaining pictures, the number of children 
predicting success ranged between 73 and 79 whereas the number of children who 
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achieved success ranged between 25 and 68. To gain a better understanding of 
differences between PM and RM prediction accuracies, Table 5 shows the number and 
percentages of children (out of 80) who predicted their performance correctly versus 
incorrectly (over- or underestimated it) for the PM task and for each of the 10 RM items. 
Goodness-of-fit tests for the RM items showed that results were significantly different 
from chance (all p values<.0001) reflecting the high percentages of children who 
overestimated their performance (from 44% to 64%, compared to the chance level of 
25%). The percentage of children who correctly predicted their RM was reliably better 
than chance (50%) only for items 7 (horse; recalled by 68 children) and item 8 (tractor; 
recalled by 53 children). Such high RM prediction accuracy for the horse picture is 
unsurprising given that it was the target of the PM task. 
Mean RM confidence across the set was high (M=2.55 SD=.41) and ranged 
between 2.41 and 2.68 (with the highest rating being for the picture of the horse). RM 
confidence ratings failed to differ significantly between children who were allocated to 
the specific- versus general instructions PM conditions (M=2.57 vs. M=2.53, 
respectively), t(78)=0.41, p=.68.  
Relations between PM and RM 
RM predictions, RM confidence ratings and RM performance were each 
examined as a function of PM using a 2 (PM prediction: will remember vs. will forget) x 
2 (PM performance: remembered vs. forgot) ANOVA. There were no significant main 
effects or interaction when considering either RM prediction or RM performance, all p 
values>.10. In the case of RM confidence ratings, there was a reliable effect of PM 
prediction indicating that children who expected to remember the PM task gave higher 
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RM confidence ratings than children who expected to forget the PM task (M=2.63 
SD=.35 vs. M=2.33 SD=.48), F(1,76)=7.05, p=.01, ηp2=.09. 
Discussion 
Like the previous experiment, Study 2 found that children were generally accurate 
and confident in their PM predictions with most (69%) correctly anticipating whether 
they would pass or fail and relatively few (19%) expecting to execute the intended action 
but ultimately forgetting to do so. As hypothesized, children’s PM was better when they 
were instructed to respond to a specific cue (i.e., horse) rather than a general cue (i.e., 
animal) but PM prediction accuracy was superior to chance in both groups. Results for 
the general instructions condition are important in showing that many children could 
correctly anticipate their ability to respond to a PM target that was not identified 
explicitly beforehand. Nevertheless, the fact that children’s predictions did not reliably 
distinguish the difficulty levels of specific- versus general instructions indicates scope for 
developmental improvement in their declarative PM metamemory. 
Results also replicated Study 1 in showing that PM prediction accuracy was 
superior to chance only for children who remembered the PM response, a pattern evident 
for both the specific- and general instruction conditions. Among children who passed the 
PM test, the ratio of predicting success versus predicting failure was 4:1. Among children 
who failed the PM test, the ratio of predicting failure versus predicting success was 3:5. 
These findings reinforce the earlier conclusion that children’s insight into their own PM 
capabilities was greater if their PM performance was good rather than poor. 
Notably, and in striking contrast to PM predictions, the vast majority of children 
over-estimated their ability to freely recall the pictures presented to the mole. Using an 
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item-by-item method of eliciting RM predictions, children foretold an average recall 
accuracy of 96% whereas they achieved a mean accuracy of 46%. Indeed, children 
almost never anticipated that they would forget to recall a picture, with only 19 children 
judging that their performance would be less than perfect (or a total of 30 predicted 
failures out of 800 predictions). Over-estimation of RM was apparent from the first 
picture (with 79 of 80 children predicting that they would be able to remember it) and 
remained high across the set (never dropping below a total of 73 ‘will remember’ 
predictions). RM prediction accuracy was superior to chance for only 2 of 10 pictures, 
with one of these being the PM target. Children also reported high levels of confidence in 
their RM predictions. 
Taken together, these results replicate and extend previous research on RM 
prediction accuracy in young children (Lipko et al., 2009, 2012; Shin et al., 2007), 
especially the studies that have used item-by-item predictions and assessed judgements of 
learning in cued recall tasks. Thus, in the study by Lipowski et al. (2013, Experiment 1), 
83% of 5-year old children predicted incorrectly that they would recall the names of all 
the 12 toy animals presented to them. Likewise, Schneider, Visé, Lockl and Nelson 
(2000), who compared item-by-item and aggregate prediction accuracy using a similar 
paradigm, found that when making immediate item-by-item predictions, 8-year old 
children on average predicted recalling 20 items out of 24 (83%) when they actually 
recalled only 11 items (46%).   
The observation of such discrepant PM and RM prediction accuracy in the present 
study suggests that 5-year old children have better insight into PM than RM. However, 
this conclusion is weakened by the fact that different methods were used to compare PM 
CHILDREN’S METAMEMORY PREDICTIONS     27 
 
versus RM predictions. Even though children made item-by-item RM predictions, there 
were 10 items in the RM task and only one target item in the event-based PM task. To 
address this issue, Study 3 aimed to see whether RM prediction accuracy would improve 
given a procedure that better matched the PM task, specifically, by asking a new group of 
children to judge their ability to recall the mole’s surname. In accordance with the PM 
procedure, then, participants were requested to make a prediction regarding subsequent 
memory performance for a single piece of information before hearing the neutral story 
and completing the picture-naming activity. Half the children heard a surname based on a 
familiar word (Mr. Rainbow) and the remainder heard a surname based on an unfamiliar 
word (Mr. Tainbow). We expected that the unfamiliar surname would be much harder to 
recall and we included this condition in case of ceiling effects in relation to children’s 
recall of the familiar surname. 
Study 3 
Method 
Participants 
Thirty-five typically developing children (14 girls, 21 boys) were recruited from 
local primary schools following informed parental- and own consent. Their ages ranged 
from 5 years 3 months to 5 years 8 months (M = 5 years 6 months). Participants were 
randomly assigned to either the ‘Rainbow’ or ‘Tainbow’ conditions (n=18 and n=17, 
respectively).   
Materials and procedure 
Materials and procedure were identical to Study 1 except that children were 
initially introduced to the mole without being told his name. In addition, just before 
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reading ‘The Clumsy Alligator’ story, the researcher gave them a single-item RM 
prediction task instead of the PM instructions. Specifically, half the children were 
informed that the mole’s name was Mr. Rainbow and the remainder were informed that 
his name was Mr. Tainbow. Children were asked to repeat the surname to ensure that 
they heard it correctly. They were then asked whether they thought they would be able to 
remember his name later on. To make it clear that they were being queried about recall 
rather than recognition-memory, the researcher explained that she would later ask them to 
“tell” her the mole’s name. After recording each child’s prediction the researcher asked 
him or her to indicate on a 3-point scale (3=very sure, 2=sure, 1=not sure) how 
confident they were in their judgement. Following the researcher’s narration of the story, 
the picture naming task commenced. Upon the appearance of the picture of a tractor 
(which occurred in the 6th position), the researcher stopped the children and asked them 
to recall the mole’s name. Participants were allowed up to 60 seconds to recall the name, 
after which time the researcher told them what it was. After finishing their verbal 
labelling of the remaining four pictures in the stack, children were thanked and returned 
to their class.  
Results 
All 18 children in the Rainbow condition and all 17 children in the Tainbow 
condition predicted that they would remember the mole’s surname. In addition, the mean 
confidence ratings in these predictions were high in both groups (M=2.44, SD=.92 and 
M=2.17, SD=1.03, respectively) and did not differ reliably (F<1). In contrast, the groups 
differed markedly in terms of actual performance. While 17 of 18 children (94%) in the 
Rainbow condition correctly remembered the mole’s surname, none of the children in the 
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Tainbow condition (0%) were able to remember it, χ2(1, N=35)=31.22, p<.0001. All 
children in the latter condition reported that they could not remember the surname rather 
than recalling the surname incorrectly.    
Discussion 
 Study 3 found that children substantially over-estimated their ability to remember 
the unfamiliar surname of the toy mole. Every one of the participants in the unfamiliar 
surname condition predicted, and was confident in predicting, that they would remember 
the name ‘Mr Tainbow’ but all proceeded to forget it when tested later on. Results of this 
condition thus confirmed those of Study 2 in showing exceedingly poor RM prediction 
capabilities. Although participants in the familiar surname condition were 100% accurate 
in their RM predictions, it is impossible to know whether this result is meaningful given 
that actual performance was errorless. Nevertheless, results of the familiar surname 
condition are consistent with those of the unfamiliar surname condition, and of Study 2, 
in showing that 5-year old children are highly likely to predict successful recall 
irrespective of what they are being asked to recall.  
General Discussion 
To our knowledge, the present investigation is the first to have explored young 
children’s metamemory awareness for PM as gauged by their ability to predict their own 
PM performance. Results showed prediction accuracy to be very good with most 
participants (around 70%) judging correctly whether they would remember to act on their 
intention to warn a toy mole not to be afraid when the target picture was uncovered 
(Studies 1 and 2). These results contrasted markedly with the findings for two RM 
procedures where children greatly overestimated their memory recall. This was true 
CHILDREN’S METAMEMORY PREDICTIONS     30 
 
whether children performed item-by-item RM prediction for 10 studied pictures (Study 2) 
or tried to estimate their recall accuracy for the mole’s surname (Study 3).  
Superior prediction accuracy for PM relative to RM cannot easily be explained in 
terms of motivational or experiential factors. In previous research on RM metamemory, 
reports of over-confident predictions by young children have been taken to mean that 
such behavior serves an adaptive function, specifically, by encouraging persistence on 
memory tasks (Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2009). From this perspective, though, it is unclear 
why PM predictions were not similarly inflated relative to actual performance. Likewise, 
it seems improbable that the effect was due to children’s greater familiarity with PM 
tasks. Winograd (1988) suggested that children often receive simple PM requests at home 
(e.g., to deliver messages or carry out chores) whereas they rarely encounter RM requests 
until formal schooling commences. Given anecdotal evidence that parents perceive their 
children’s PM lapses as more problematic than RM errors (Meacham, 1977), it could thus 
be surmised that the development of PM metamemory skills benefits from frequent 
feedback. However, our findings indicated that PM prediction accuracy varied according 
to actual PM performance – specifically, Studies 1 and 2 showed that children who 
passed the PM task made more accurate predictions than children who failed the PM task. 
If corrective feedback is important to the development of children’s memory prediction 
skills then it follows that children with poor PM should be more aware of their 
shortcomings in this domain than children with good PM are aware of their strengths. 
Alternatively, it could be argued that PM and RM are distinct forms of memory. 
This was the conclusion reached by Kvavilashvili et al. (2001) following a comparison of 
PM and RM capabilities in children aged 4- to 7 years. They found that age explained 
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only half the variance in PM (7%) compared to RM (15%); moreover, there was no 
significant relationship between the two. In Study 2 of the present investigation it was 
similarly shown that RM performance failed to differ reliably between children who 
passed the PM test and children who failed – thus, our results indicated that PM and RM 
were functioning independently in this young age group (for similar findings, see 
Guajardo & Best, 2000). If PM constitutes a unique form of memory that matures earlier 
than RM, then associated metamemory skills might likewise develop more rapidly 
(Kvavilashvili et al., 2008). This would accord with evidence that children acquire 
declarative knowledge regarding PM at a younger age than they acquire declarative 
knowledge regarding RM (Beal, 1985; Kreutzer et al., 1975).  
On the other hand, it might be premature to conclude that young children will 
always show superior prediction accuracy for PM compared to RM. Some studies have 
found that children’s RM prediction accuracy improves when predictions are solicited 
after a short delay, a phenomenon attributed to the fact that delayed judgements are more 
likely to draw on long- rather than short-term memory (e.g., Schneider et al., 2000). For 
example, Lipowski et al. (2013) reported that the percentage of 4- and 5-year-old children 
who predicted recalling all the studied items when questioned immediately (83%) 
dropped to 48% in the delayed judgement of learning condition in which children had to 
attempt to recall the toys’ names after two minutes from hearing the names and then 
provide their recall predictions. These findings raise the possibility that our own 
participants could have performed to a much higher level on the RM prediction tasks had 
we not asked them to make their predictions straight away. 
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Rather than simply comparing the accuracy of PM versus RM predictions, a more 
informative approach in future research might be to explore the cognitive mechanisms 
underlying them. Interestingly, despite finding that children’s delayed judgements of 
learning were accurate on average, Lipowski et al. (2013) noted that such judgements 
were not significantly correlated with actual recall. Their findings therefore suggested 
that for young children the processes involved in RM predictions are largely unrelated to 
those driving RM performance. These results are in striking contrast to those observed for 
PM in the present investigation, which were notable in revealing a robust association 
between PM predictions and PM performance that was apparent in four individual 
conditions across the first two studies. Regardless of what conclusions might eventually 
be drawn regarding RM, we believe that the present findings are important in implicating 
a strong involvement of self-reflective awareness in successful PM in young children. 
Studies 1 and 2 consistently demonstrated that children who remembered to enact their 
PM intention were likely to predict they would succeed on the task (with a success rate 
over 80%) whereas children who forgot to enact their PM intention had little idea 
whether they would succeed or fail (with a success rate not superior to chance). 
Additionally, Study 1 found that presenting a reminder story that highlighted memory 
issues tended to boost PM performance in children who predicted that they would 
remember to enact their intention but made no difference to the PM performance of 
children who thought they would forget to enact their intention. These two sets of 
findings converge on the conclusion that the cognitive processes involved in optimistic 
PM performance predictions were also integral to PM itself. 
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As suggested earlier, one possible candidate for a self-reflective process 
underlying predictions of PM success and actual PM is future thinking. It has been 
postulated that people encode PM intentions more efficiently if they mentally self-project 
into a future time and place appropriate to the intended response, probably because the 
act of imaginative pre-experiencing the PM cues increases their salience (Brewer & 
Marsh, 2010). Buckner and Carroll (2007) defined self-projection as “the ability to shift 
perspective from the immediate present to alternative perspectives” (p. 49), and they 
reviewed evidence that it relies heavily on brain regions involved in episodic memory 
and theory of mind, especially medial temporal-parietal lobe regions. In line with these 
ideas, Ford et al. (2012) observed that 4- to 5-year-old children’s performance on two 
different measures of event-based PM was related to their ability to reason about false 
belief, even after controlling for age, verbal intelligence, working memory, and inhibitory 
skills. Notably, false-belief understanding and inhibitory skills appeared to tap different 
aspects of PM; whereas inhibition predicted PM only when children needed to suspend 
their activity on the ongoing task, theory of mind predicted PM irrespective of whether 
the ongoing task needed to be interrupted. Based on these findings, Ford et al. postulated 
that the false-belief tests captured individual differences in how effectively children 
formed their intention in the first place based on their propensity for future thinking. 
Given evidence that the capacity for future thinking develops rapidly between the 
ages of 3- and 6 years it would not be surprising if it constitutes an important source of 
individual differences in young children’s PM (Atance & Jackson, 2009; Ford et al., 
2012). In light of the present results, we suggest that future thinking also plays an 
important role in children’s predictions of future success in PM tasks – essentially, a 
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child’s act of imagining themselves carrying out the task as planned should bolster not 
only the chances of their actually doing it but subjective confidence in their ability to do 
it. In contrast, performance predictions regarding RM might rely much more heavily on 
declarative knowledge than any imaginative pre-experiencing of memory retrieval.  
Conclusions 
In conclusion, the present investigation yielded important preliminary evidence 
that 5-year-old children are very good at predicting how well they will do on PM tests. It 
was additionally shown that (1) PM prediction accuracy was higher among children who 
remembered the PM task than among children who forgot it (Studies 1 & 2), and (2) 
encouraging children to reflect on memory processes by exposing them to a reminder 
story was likely to benefit their PM only when they had made an optimistic PM 
prediction (Study 1). As discussed, one explanation of these findings is that the kinds of 
self-reflective processes involved in performance predictions are also inherent to setting 
up PM intentions, specifically, by supporting self-projection into the future. Follow-up 
studies could explore this possibility by directly examining the relations between future 
thinking (and other forms of self-projection) and PM procedural metamemory.  
Additionally, future research could address potential practical applications of 
asking children to predict their PM. It is well-documented that performance predictions 
enhance RM in adults and a recent study by Meier, von Wartburg, Matter, Rothen, and 
Reber (2011) found the same to be true of PM. These researchers suggested that 
performance predictions either increase participants’ commitment to the PM response or 
raise the activation of their plan to make it more accessible. Both ideas are compatible 
with the idea that forming a PM intention involves future thinking and suggest that it 
CHILDREN’S METAMEMORY PREDICTIONS     35 
 
would be fruitful in future investigations to compare PM accuracy between children who 
either do or do not make prior performance predictions.  
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Table 1 
Number (Percentages) of Children in Study 1 who Remembered or Forgot the 
Prospective Memory Task as a Function of Prospective Memory Prediction 
 
(a) Whole group (n=46) 
                      PM Performance  
PM Prediction       Remembered          Forgot  Total 
Will Remember            21 (75%)             7 (25%)   28 (100%)   
Will Forget             3 (17%)          15 (83%)  18 (100%)  
Total            24 (52%)          22 (48%)  46 (100%) 
 
(b) Neutral story condition (n=23) 
                      PM Performance  
PM prediction       Remembered          Forgot  Total 
Will Remember              7 (58%)           5 (42%)  12 (100%)  
Will Forget              2 (18%)           9 (82%)   11 (100%) 
Total               9 (39%)         14 (61%)  23 (100%)  
 
(c) Reminder story condition (n=23) 
                      PM Performance  
PM Prediction       Remembered          Forgot  Total 
Will Remember           14 (87.5%)           2 (12.5%)  16 (100%)   
Will Forget             1 (14%)           6 (86%)    7 (100%) 
Total            15 (65%)           8 (35%)  23 (100%) 
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Table 2 
Means (and Standard Deviations) of Confidence Ratings of Children in Study 1 who 
Remembered or Forgot the Prospective Memory Task as a Function of Prospective Memory 
Prediction 
 
Whole group (n=46) 
                      PM Performance  
PM Prediction       Remembered          Forgot  Total 
Will Remember          2.67 (.66)        2.57 (.79)   2.64 (.68)   
Will Forget          2.33 (1.16)         2.47 (.83)   2.44 (.86)  
Total           2.63 (.71)         2.50 (.80)  2.57 (.75)  
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Table 3 
Number (Percentages) of Children in Study 2 who Remembered or Forgot the 
Prospective Memory Task as a Function of Prospective Memory Prediction 
 
(a) Whole group (n=80) 
                      PM Performance  
PM Prediction       Remembered          Forgot  Total 
Will Remember           43 (74%)          15 (26%)  58 (100%) 
Will Forget           10 (45%)          12 (55%)  22 (100%) 
Total            53 (66%)          27 (34%)  80 (100%) 
 
(b) Specific instructions condition (n=40) 
                      PM Performance  
PM prediction       Remembered          Forgot  Total 
Will Remember            25 (81%)           6 (19%)  31 (100%)   
Will Forget              6 (67%)           3 (33%)    9 (100%) 
Total             31 (77.5)           9 (22.5%)  40 (100%)  
 
(c) General instructions condition (n=40) 
                      PM Performance  
PM Prediction       Remembered          Forgot  Total 
Will Remember           18 (67%)           9 (33%)  27 (100%)  
Will Forget             4 (31%)           9 (69%)  13 (100%) 
Total            22 (55%)         18 (45%)  40 (100%)  
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Table 4 
Means (and Standard Deviations) of Confidence Ratings of Children in Study 3 who 
Remembered or Forgot the Prospective Memory Task as a Function of Prospective Memory 
Prediction 
 
Whole group (n=80) 
                      PM Performance  
PM Prediction       Remembered          Forgot  Total 
Will Remember          2.74 (.54)        2.73 (.59)   2.74 (.55)   
Will Forget          2.30 (.82)         2.42 (.79)   2.36 (.79)  
Total           2.66 (.62)         2.59 (.69)  2.64 (.64)  
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Table 5 
Number (Percentages) of Children as a Function of Type of Prediction (Correct vs. 
Overestimation vs. Underestimation) for the Prospective Memory Task and Retrospective 
Memory Items 
 
                             
                           Type of Prediction 
 
 
 
Item type 
Correct Overestimation Underestimation 
 
 
   Total 
 
PM task 
 
 
55 (69%) 
 
15 (19%) 
 
10 (12%) 
 
80 (100%) 
RM – Item 1 
 
30 (37.5%) 50 (62.5%) 0 (0%) 80 (100%) 
RM – Item 2 
 
29 (36%) 49 (61%) 2 (3%) 80 (100%) 
RM – Item 3 
 
29 (36%) 51 (64%) 0 (0%) 80 (100%) 
RM – Item 4 
 
29 (36%)  51 (64%) 0 (0%) 80 (100%) 
RM – Item 5 
 
27 (34%) 51 (64%) 2 (2%) 80 (100%) 
RM – Item 6 
 
33 (41%) 47 (59%) 0 (0%) 80 (100%) 
RM – Item 7 
 
67 (84%) 12 (15%) 1 (1%) 80 (100%) 
RM – Item 8 
 
54 (67%)  23 (29%) 3 (4%) 80 (100%) 
RM – Item 9 
 
42 (52%) 35 (44%) 3 (4%) 80 (100%) 
RM – Item 10 
 
37 (46%) 42 (53%) 1 (1%) 80 (100%) 
Note. The number (percentages) of children who would be expected by chance to make 
correct predictions, or over- versus underestimate their performance, was 40 (50%), 20 
(25%) and 20 (25%) respectively.  
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